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· Decision makers, parliamentarians (as a pressure group), magistrates and local communities.
♦ To curb corruption and widespread embezzlement in the management of forest-based revenue, codes of conduct for management committee members must designed at village and council levels.
· NGOs/projects, social networks and local communities.
♦ To enable local discretion over forest-based fund management, mechanisms must be set up for the direct transfer, in cash, of the 10% of annual forestry fees earmarked for forest-edge village communities.
This can be done through a series of policy meetings aimed at the signing of a new MINEFI (Ministère des Finances)/MINEDAT (Ministère de l'Administration Territoriale) Joint Order for direct cash transfers and of Municipal Orders relating to the management of council forest revenue.
· Decision makers, mayors, local councillors, donors and parliamentarians (as a pressure group).
♦ To promote downward accountability and local democracy, appropriate social methodologies and democratic procedures are required to govern the choice and constitution of management committees effectively.
· NGOs and social/policy researchers.
♦ To enhance equitable and efficient local reinvestment of wildlife income, management committees must be granted full and independent powers to manage revenue allocated to forest-edge village communities.
This can be done through the Signing of a Joint Ministerial Order (Ministry in Charge of Forests -(MINFOF)/MINEFI) giving full powers to the Comités de Valorisation des Ressources Fauniques (COVAREFs) for the management of this revenue, without interference by officials of MINFOF or administrative and council authorities.
· Decision makers, donors and parliamentarians (as a pressure group).
♦ To empower local communities in forested
Cameroon, the principle of an Equalization Fund for forest-based revenue -intended as a nation-wide redistribution of annual forestry fees -must be revised, since it is rejected by forest-edge communities and rural councils.
Introduction
Cameroon embarked on the decentralization of forest management with the promulgation of the 1994 Forestry Law (RoC 1994) . Until then, forest management had been based, on the whole, on laws introduced in France in 1830, following the French Civil Code (Le Roy 1982) . Between the colonial period and 1994, Cameroon's legal tenure arrangements placed forests under exclusive State ownership and management. A Provisional Zoning Plan designed in 1993 defines the various 'public' uses of forestry and agro-forestry areas and introduces meaningful change in forest tenure. Similarly, the 1994 Forestry Law (RoC 1994), along with subsequent legal and administrative instruments, constituted a major policy shift.
Cameroon has a vast forested domain. Out of a total surface area of 47.5 million ha, dense rainforest occupies 23.9 million ha, 17 million ha of which are exploitable for logging. At the end of the 1990s, the country plunged into a severe economic crisis characterized by the weakening of the urban middle classes, the exodus of town dwellers to rural areas, and disruption of rural economies. About 49.6% of the country's 15.8 million inhabitants live in rural areas, where purchasing power dropped significantly and livelihoods were severely disrupted (RoC 2003) . Under these conditions, rural communities' concerns for their well-being were increasingly directed at the exploitation of natural resources, especially timber, for revenue that they generate.
A facies of Cameroon's humid dense forest.
Photo by Patrick Nyemeck.
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Theory indicates that to obtain positive and sustainable policy, political, socioeconomic and environmental outcomes, decentralization in the area of natural resources must be democratic and substantive (Manor 1999; Ribot 2003 Ribot , 2005 . Decentralization is often purported to have the following advantages: (i) more effective service delivery; (ii) reduced administrative transaction costs; (iii) increased popular participation; (iv) stronger powers for local governments, local authorities and local communities; (vi) greater sense of responsibility amongst local actors; (vii) equity in access to resources and financial benefits and distributional equity; and (viii) environmental sustainability etc. (see Box 1).
undertaken over the past five years by the CIFOR-WRI team. These observations and empirical work are the basis of the recommendations outlined above.
The Structure of Cameroon's Forest Management Decentralization
The provisions of the 1994 Forestry Law establish forestry, wildlife and fisheries regulations. Its Application Decree details the modes of implementation (RoC 1995) . These tools, along with subsequent orders and circulars, form the legal bases for the decentralized management of Cameroon's forests. As a whole, these forestry reforms have three objectives: (i) to promote community participation in forest management;
(ii) to contribute to poverty reduction; and (iii) to contribute to sustainable forest resources management. These reforms establish four basic mechanisms that are the foundations of decentralized forest management in Cameroon: (i) council forests; (ii) community forests; (iii) annual forestry fees; and (iv) community-managed hunting zones.
Council Forests
A council forest 'is any forest that has been classified and assigned to a council concerned or that was planted by the council on council land ' (RoC 1994) . Constitutional reforms in 1996 establish the 'council' as the basic decentralized territorial unit. The 1994 Forestry Law and its Application Decree transfer to these entities ownership rights over the biophysical unit within their jurisdiction (the council forest) and over the financial benefits accruing from the exploitation of its forest products, including timber (RoC 1994 (RoC , 1995 1995) . A community forest is a non planted forest that can be set up only in an area over which the village community concerned has customary rights. The law states that a village community wishing to establish a community forest should organize itself into a legal entity. This entity can be a common initiative group, an association, an economic interest group or a co-operative.
A significant innovation in favour of local populations, which encourages the creation of community forests, appeared in the wake of the law. This is the pre-emption right, which institutes the priority attribution of any forest likely to be established as a community forest to the neighbouring village communities. The objective of this prescription is to give priority to village communities, rather than logging companies, when a forest may be allocated under a vente de coupe -a sale of standing volume in small logging units of less than 2500 ha (MINEF 2001) . 
Annual Forestry Fees

Community-managed Hunting Zones
The current forestry law makes a brief reference to community hunting areas, but this provision has not actually been put into practice. Nevertheless, 
Implementing
Decentralized Forest Management
The following section provides an outline of the implementation process for these four decentralization policy options. While the exploitation of community forests and the redistribution of annual forestry fees seem to be the more advanced and scaled-up experiments, the exploitation of ZICGCs, which exist only in the South East, and of communal forests, of which there are only five, remains marginal.
Establishment of Council Forests
In the pioneer case of Dimako, which has served as a source of inspiration for other councils, the establishment of the council forest involved the following steps: ♦ classification of the forest, for which local communities were consulted; ♦ organizational arrangements, which led to the formation of the Consultative Management Committee, with a representative of each of the 17 villages that comprise Dimako Rural Council as well as statutory members, and a Monitoring Committee; ♦ drafting of a management plan, by a joint French-Cameroonian project, using socioeconomic data and forest inventories; ♦ legal and administrative procedures, including:
(i) approval of the management plan by the Ministry in charge of forests (formerly MINEF, now MINFOF) (ii) a Prime Ministerial Decree with regard to the official classification of the forest on behalf of the council in June 2001; (iii) official authorization, implying that exploitation of the forest could begin.
Logging of the Dimako council forest began in 2005. Revenue generated to date is estimated at 72 210 000 CFA francs.
Community Forest Implementation and Exploitation
The Manual of Norms and Procedures for the Attribution and Management of Community Forests -a methodological guide produced by the Community Forestry Unit of MINFOF -proposes the following stages for establishing a community forest: ♦ public awareness and information campaign at the level of the village community applying for a forest; ♦ formation of a management entity; ♦ delimitation of the future community forest; ♦ designation of the community forest; ♦ development of a simple management plan; ♦ approval of the simple management plan by the services of MINFOF; ♦ signing of the management agreement between MINFOF and the village community concerned.
Once the management agreement has been signed, the village community can begin logging.
There are three forms of exploitation: (i) artisanal logging under the control of the community itself;
(ii) artisanal logging in partnership with a logging company; and (iii) industrial logging. Village committees -known as 'management entities' -are responsible for the management and exploitation of community forests and related revenue. An overall assessment based on various sources shows that annual revenue generated by community forests ranges from 1.48 million CFA francs for a low-revenue-yielding forest to 23.8 million CFA francs for a high-yielding one. The following figure presents the annual revenue of selected cases. 
Allocation of Annual Forestry Fees
To disburse the 50% of annual forestry fees intended for rural councils and forest-edge village 
Community-managed Hunting Zones
In villages with ZICGCs, COVAREFs are responsible for identifying local development problems, seeking appropriate solutions and ensuring the implementation of all projects of community interest in the villages. A COVAREF may cover one or more villages (Ontcha Mpele et al. 2005) . The revenue managed by COVAREFs is derived mainly from the leasing of the community- managed hunting zones to professional hunting concessionaires, who pay rental or access rights for the period of the lease. Other financial resources are also derived from a portion of fees for: (i) the leasing of professional hunting zones (ZICs) located near the villages; (ii) related felling tax; (iii) capture tax; and (iv) auction sales, damages and interest paid by poachers to the regional forest and wildlife service.
The financial resources of COVAREFs are deposited in accounts at the Post Offices in the nearest towns. This money is accessible to the chairs and treasurers of these committees. The money can, however, be withdrawn only with the approval of an official of the regional forest and wildlife service. The amount of wildlife revenue in COVAREFs, from 2000 to 2004, ranged from a low of 1.9 million CFA francs (Njombi-Lobo) to a high of 17.3 million (Salokomo).
Research
The research undertaken for this policy brief is based on a set of studies on environmental decentralization and governance in Cameroon carried out jointly by CIFOR and WRI between 2000 and 2006. These studies were conducted with four main objectives: (i) to generate knowledge and public and strategic information on forest management decentralization and forest governance; (ii) to contribute to the improvement of policy and legal frameworks relating to the decentralization of forest management, associated financial benefits and forest governance; (iii) to contribute to the improvement of practices in the management and exploitation of community forests and related revenue, council forests, wildlife revenue, annual forestry fees and other forms of revenue or compensation; and (iv) to disseminate results, policy lessons and recommendations in other countries in the Congo Basin, in order to support incipient forestry reforms. To answer these questions, this study identified and monitored the performance of 15 community forest management committees, 1 rural council (for the Dimako Council Forest), 1 council forest management consultative committee, 4 rural councils (for annual forestry fees), and 15 village annual forestry fees management committees. Additional committees were studied through informal visits to other villages. Many different actors in the village communities were consulted in an iterative manner. Decision makers, project managers, municipal councillors, field practitioners, researchers, key and strategic informants, logging operators and strategic groups were interviewed at the central, regional and local levels. The Forestry Law -the Application, in effect -and related orders were reviewed and analyzed.
Results
Security of Transfer
The forestry law transfers, to regional and local entities, rights of ownership over forest units of the permanent and non permanent forest estate and rights of autonomous management of financial benefits derived from their exploitation. Not all of these transfers are secure, however. ♦ Of the four mechanisms addressed by the study, the transfer of rights and powers is effective and permanent only in the case of council forests. These powers -the powers to own a council forest, to exploit it and to manage the revenue -are discretionary and rely on the principle of subsidiarity. ♦ Powers have been delegated to village communities to establish community forests and for the autonomous management of financial benefits derived from their exploitation. In this case, powers are only delegated because the 1994 Forestry Law states that if a community forest is 'poorly managed' the Ministry in charge of forests will withdraw the managerial powers from the village community concerned. This process of power transfer is conditional and has the effect of making local managers upwardly accountable to the regional officials of MINFOF, thus reducing local freedom in decision making (see Box 2).
BOX 2: Is a community forest a loan?
Cameroon's forestry laws and regulations state that community forest management agreements must be signed for 5-year periods, renewable for a total of 25 years. If the forest is poorly managed -sometimes defined as such only by experts -the management agreement is suspended. This happened in many community forests -including that of Kongo -in 2002 and . It raises the question as to whether community forests actually constitute a transfer of powers, a delegation of powers or a loan granted only under certain conditions.
Source: Oyono et al. (2006)
♦ Decentralized forestry tax revenues are distributed following double standards. Ten per cent of the annual forestry fee revenue is earmarked for forest-edge villages. This 10% is not, however, paid directly to the forest-edge village communities in cash. The communities have very little power over the management of these funds. Instead, in the redistribution process, the funds are retained at the level of municipal (primarily mayors) and administrative authorities. In most cases, local communities are subordinate stakeholders: decision making about socioeconomic amenities to be established at the village level is usurped by municipal and administrative authorities (see Box 3).
Institutional Choice and Constitutional Issues
The choice of management committees as the local institutions receiving powers, and the way in which these local committees are constituted, has resulted in elite capture, conflict and corruption. ♦ Although created to undertake the decentralized management of forests and distribution of benefits on behalf of their communities, management committees are actually governed such that external actors Timber is an important source of revenue in Cameroon. Photo by Paolo Cerutti (mayors, administrative authorities, NGOs and projects, regional services of MINFOF, logging companies, external elite, etc.) wield substantial influence. ♦ To deal with annual forestry fees, management committees were set up hastily by administrative authorities and logging companies. They failed to follow appropriate methodologies that could support the development of local collective action and microgovernance principles in the management of forest-based revenue. Established in this way, these organizations have no locally relevant foundations or legitimacy, ♦ Numerous village management committees were established without competitive election or democratic process. Rather, they were instituted through what appear to be very undemocratic mechanisms such as cooption and self appointment. For example, in the case of 15 village annual forestry fee management committees, 40% of the members were 'selfappointed' (mainly elite) and 27% coopted. The result, again, is a lack of local social legitimacy. ♦ As committees were designed undemocratically on the whole, their leaders use their powers undemocratically. This poor local exercise of powers -bad governance -is characterized by: (i) the confiscation, by management committee leaders, of decision making regarding the management of community forest revenue; (ii) the resulting institutionalization of embezzlement and corruption; (iii) the absence of downward accountability of these leaders to village communities that 'appointed' or elected them; (iv) the absence of 'modern' or 'traditional' sanctions; (v) authoritarianism via the substitution of village management committees for village communities; and (vi) the hijacking of committees by the elite. The existence of these practices implies that the institutions are undemocratic and there is an absence of local democracy (see Box 4).
Box 4: The 'dirigisme' of management committee leaders
Several management committee leaders in the Messamena district lack leadership experience and became 'leaders' only because of the 1994 Forestry Law and NGOs. This lack of capacity is demonstrated in many ways. For example, the mandate of the Kompia Community Forest Common Initiative Group (CIG) ended in 2002. The village community therefore called for a general meeting to make a progress report and elect a new bureau -the management body -of the CIG. Not only was there no general meeting, but no meeting had been held there for more than seven months. For more than two years, the executive bureau presented no report. This bureau was accused by the villagers of 'dirigisme' and embezzlement.
Source: Etoungou (2003)
♦ The emergence of 'new local authorities' -members of various village management committees -through institutional change related to decentralization policies is perceived by traditional authorities (lineage heads, elders and chiefs) as a coup d'état. The result is a schism within the village, or institutional dualism, and increased conflict (over power, pre-eminence and other interests), setting the opposing groups against each other and impacting negatively on local management dynamics and livelihoods improvement.
Accountable Representation
In part because of the way in which committees were constituted, village management committee operations are often governed by concerns of upward accountability -to municipal authorities, regional administrative authorities, NGOs, representatives of MINFOF, logging companies etc.
-rather than to village communities. ♦ The local management of forests and derived benefits is characterized by the emergence, through management committees, of a local 'environmental elite' -nouveaux riches 'middlemen' -cut off from local populations. They are, however, linked to external elites committed to the capture of community forests -such as regional administrative corporatism, municipal authorities and logging companies -through a combination for setting up community farms; 5.18% for village water projects; 6.62% for the purchase of motorbikes; 3.13% for providing material support to the Baka Pygmies; 0.84% for village electrification; 3.10% for housing improvement; and 6.25% for the protection of some community-managed hunting zones. These percentages are marked by the predominance of expenses related to COVAREF operations, which are not easy to assess. ♦ The redistribution of annual forestry fees and their conversion, by rural councils, into socioeconomic projects in constituent villages is characterized by overbilling, the declaration of fictitious projects, and embezzlement (Kouna 2001; Bigombé Logo 2003) . Whole villages have been excluded from the redistribution process over many years; projects are invoiced at triple their real cost; council revenue and tax collectors impose imaginary taxes on contractors, take abusive deductions (sometimes 20-30%) from payment amounts, and make this a precondition for contracts (see Box 5). The idea of an Equalization Fund, which would -as planned by experts from the Prime Minister's office -recentralize revenues that would then be redistributed to non-forested areas, would only increase corruption and further decrease the benefits due to forest-edge communities. ♦ Financial resources generated from the exploitation of community forests are tangible, as this involves selling planks for cash. Concrete socioeconomic results are found in some villages, where housing improvements, classroom repairs, establishment of community oil palm nurseries, well construction, bee keeping, cultural initiatives, etc., can be seen. As shown in Figure 1 , annual revenue ranges 
Box 6: Degradation risks for community forests
Villagers mention, with regret, the considerable forest loss caused by the disorderly felling of trees by the logging company, Likeng and Co., with the complicity of management committee officials. The institutional arrangements surrounding the management of the Mboké Community Forest, which are far too favourable to the village chief (also the committee chair), the absence of downward accountability, and the village community's low level of control over management committee members had jeopardised the forest's ecology after only two years. The Mboké Community Forest -which the chief often refers to as 'my forest' -is, in fact, one of the most threatened in the southern part of Cameroon, due mainly to 'personal enrichment' and the confiscation of community decision making.
Source: Oyono et al. (2006) from about 1.5 million CFA francs to 25 million CFA francs. These disparities are explained by a series of factors, such as: (i) method of exploitation (artisanal or industrial, artisanal under the control of the community itself or a logging company); (ii) whether or not the community forest has been hijacked by an elite or logging company; (iii) negotiation strategies; and (iv) market structure. ♦ In spite of some important benefits, there is a disproportionate gap between the revenue generated from community forests and the quality and quantity of socioeconomic benefits derived by the villages concerned. Rather, the management of financial resources from community-forest exploitation is characterized by the embezzlement of funds by committee members and strategies for individual enrichment. ♦ The establishment of community forests involves significant financial costs for local communities and institutions. This is one of the many factors that hinder local adoption of the process and facilitate the 'hijacking' of several of these forests by the elite and logging companies. ♦ With regard to ecological effects, the exploitation and management of community forests is not sustainable (see Box 6). Rather, it is resulting in ecosystem degradation due to the combined weakness of institutional arrangements, the personal enrichment of individual management committee officials, the maximization of profits by forest contractors, and the lack of control by regional forestry services. ♦ Revenue generated by timber exploitation in the Dimako Council Forests has been 
The Way Forward
Certain aspects of forest policy and the legal and administrative arsenal that support it need to be revised (see Recommendations). This would involve facilitating policy innovation and the improvement of the forestry law and related administrative instruments in force, in the light of results, assets and shortcomings recorded in and around the field of decentralized management of forests and derived benefits. Further research on forestry policy in Cameroon should seek to identify ways in which to influence policies and decision making, as well as practices on the ground, through concrete recommendations, advocacy, networking and monitoring.
